Crossing borders for protection: The relationship between an internationally displaced person and their host State under international law by Oosterhoff, Lidewij
 The relationship between an internationally displaced person and their host State under international law 
  
i 
  
LIDEWIJ OOSTERHOFF 
 
CROSSING BORDERS FOR PROTECTION 
The relationship between an internationally displaced person and 
their host State under international law 
 
 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
LAWS 523: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
 
2015 
 
ii The relationship between an internationally displaced person and their host-State under international law 
  
 
  
Table of Contents 
I Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
II Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 3 
A Asylum-seeker ............................................................................................................................. 3 
B Refugee ........................................................................................................................................... 4 
C Internally displace person ....................................................................................................... 4 
D Non-refoulement ......................................................................................................................... 5 
E State sovereignty ......................................................................................................................... 6 
III The situation in Syria ..................................................................................................... 6 
IV The Law................................................................................................................................ 8 
A The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.......................................................... 9 1 Article 1 ................................................................................................................................................... 10 (a) Race ....................................................................................................................................................... 11 (b) Nationality .......................................................................................................................................... 12 (c) Membership of a Social Group .................................................................................................... 12 (d) Political opinion ............................................................................................................................... 13 (e) Religion ................................................................................................................................................ 13 (f) Fear of persecution .......................................................................................................................... 14 2 Protection ............................................................................................................................................... 16 3 Article 33 ................................................................................................................................................ 17 
B The Refugee Convention and the Syrian situation ....................................................... 18 
C Exceptions to recognition as a refugee ............................................................................. 19 1 Article 1F(a)........................................................................................................................................... 20 2 Article 1F (b) ......................................................................................................................................... 23 
D Exceptions to non-refoulement .......................................................................................... 26 
E Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War  ........ 28 
F Geneva Convention Protocol Additional I 1977 ............................................................ 32 
G Human Rights Law ................................................................................................................... 33 1 European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ........................................................................................................................................................ 34 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ............................................................ 34 
  
iii The relationship between an internationally displaced person and their host-State under international law 
  
  
H Other international law instruments ............................................................................... 35 3 The Dublin II Regulation .................................................................................................................. 35 
I Non EU Conventions ................................................................................................................. 37 1 Convention Concerning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa ............. 38 2 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees ............................................................................................. 38 
J The Responsibility to Protect................................................................................................ 39 
V Case Law ............................................................................................................................. 43 
A M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece ................................................................................................. 44 
B Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy ............................................................................................. 48 
C Germany v Y and Z .................................................................................................................... 49 
VI Alternatives ..................................................................................................................... 50 
A Refoulement ............................................................................................................................... 51 
B Voluntary repatriation ........................................................................................................... 51 
C Temporary asylum ................................................................................................................... 52 
D Internal 'safe zones' ................................................................................................................ 53 
VII Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 56 
 
iv The relationship between an internationally displaced person and their host-State under international law 
  
 
Abstract 
This Paper seeks to establish what duties are owed to an asylum-seeker by his or her host 
State under international law. The Paper explains how an individual can be recognised 
as a genuine refugee, as opposed to an asylum-seeker and what exactly this means under 
the relevant international law instruments. It analyses what responsibilities and duties 
are owed to refugees by their host State and when these can be revoked.   
 
Focusing on the large influx of displaced people from Syria who have come into Europe 
recently, the Paper concludes that the majority of Syrians would not meet the 
requirements for recognition as a genuine refugee. However, while the instruments do 
not place binding duties on States to offer protection to displaced persons, a number – for 
example, Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocol I, Human Rights instruments 
and the responsibility to protect – do place discretionary duties. 
 
In the past, the EU – mainly through the Courts – has shown a willingness to be bound by 
these discretionary duties. Whether this will continue in regards to the Syrian asylum-
seekers remains unclear at time of writing. The Paper canvases a number of alternative 
ways for Europe to approach the Refugee Crisis. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,505 words. 
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I Introduction  
In 2015 Europe entered into what is being described as a humanitarian emergency, after 
well over half a million displaced Syrian persons – who were mainly displaced due to a 
Non International Armed Conflict (NIAC) in their homeland – entered into Europe 
seeking to escape the conflict.1 
 
This has placed a strain on European countries as they struggle to find resources to cater 
for the extra people.2 Europe continues to discuss the best way to deal with what has been 
labelled the European Refugee Crisis. The options range from mass resettlement and 
inclusion on the one hand, to building a wall to separate Greece from the rest of Europe 
on the other.3 Obviously this is polarising Europe, igniting sectarianism and bolstering 
both the extreme left and extreme right.4 
 
This paper will examine the international law instruments – including International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) – governing the relationship between a displaced person and 
their host State. While there are many displaced people across the world,5 this Paper 
focuses on displaced Syrians who are currently within the European Union (EU)6. It 
canvases what international law applies to this situation and what duties, responsibilities 
and rights this law places on both displaced Syrians and their host EU State.
  
1  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR and International Organisation for 
Migrants (IOM) “A million of refugees and migrants flee to Europe in 2015” (press release, 22 
December 2015). 
2  António Guterres, UNHCR “UNHCR’s proposal in light of the EU response to the refugee crisis 
and the EU package of 9 September 2015” (conference paper, Brussels, 10 September 2015) at 3. 
3  Patrick Kingsley “When there’s a wall there’s no way: refugee crisis needs a better idea” the 
Guardian (online ed., London, 25 January 2016). 
4  C.J. Polychroniou “Interview with Noam Chomsky: is European Integration Unravelling?” 
Truthout (online ed., 25 January 2016). 
5  UNHCR “World-wide displacement hits all-time-high as war and persecution increase” (press 
release, 18 June 2015). 
6  The EU zone has been chosen as the focus because once as person is in one of the EU countries, 
movement to other countries is much less difficult due to the Schengen Visa Zone.  
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It starts by outlining the common terms and explores their relevance. This includes 
explaining how a person can be recognised as a genuine refugee, as opposed to an 
asylum-seeker. The Paper concludes that despite fleeing from grave war crimes in Syria, 
it is unlikely that the majority of Syrians in The EU will be recognised as genuine 
refugees and therefore will not trigger the application of compulsory protection from their 
host State. It assesses what exactly this distinction means in practice and under the 
relevant instruments, and outlines how it affects the relationship between host State and 
displaced persons.  
 
While host States do not have a compulsory legal duty, international law does place a 
largely discretionary duty on States to protect displaced persons who do not meet the test 
as a genuine refugee, as well as a negative duty not to return (refouler) an asylum-seeker 
to a place where they face persecution. 
 
The Paper looks to EU case law to establish that, in the past, the EU Courts have 
interpreted a host State’s duty under international and EU law in a broad manner. While it 
is unclear how EU States will deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis, in the past, Courts 
have shown a propensity to focus on asylum-seekers’ rights rather than State sovereignty.  
 
The Paper concludes that EU States are not required under international law to provide 
asylum, however, it can be granted as a discretionary decision. If a discretionary scheme 
proves too time consuming, EU States can consider entering into a region specific 
instrument, similar to one implemented in Africa and the Americas, to assist with 
recognising and assimilating displaced persons easily. Should States not wish to provide 
asylum, the Paper provides some alternative ways to protect refugees from war crimes, 
including temporary asylum and ‘safe-zones’. 
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II Definitions 
To better understand what the relationship should be between displaced Syrian persons 
and their host State, it is important to understand the meaning of a number of important 
terms. 
A Asylum-seeker 
The word asylum relates to the protection a State can grant on its territory to a person 
who seeks it. Therefore, an asylum-seeker is someone in search for that protection from a 
State that is not his or her State of nationality.7  
 
The term asylum-seeker is broad and covers a diverse range of people. However, often 
these people seek recognition as a refugee and the subsequent protection afforded as a 
result of this recognition.8  
 
While there is currently no legal instrument outlining exactly what asylum is and how 
people can be granted asylum, the Court of Justice of the European Union has suggested 
the granting of asylum is a discretionary decision States may make under domestic or 
international law.9 This Paper discussed what discretionary protections can be afforded to 
asylum-seekers under international law. 
 
This paper focuses on the relationship and the duties owed by States to both asylum-
seekers and refugees. However, the majority of persons it refers to have not been 
recognised as a refugee and the Paper suggests it is unlikely they will they be recognised 
as such. To avoid confusion, they will not be referred to as ‘refugees’ but as ‘asylum-
seekers’ or ‘displaced persons’. 
  
  
7  María-Teresa Gil-Baso “Asylum as a General Principle of International Law” (2015) 27 Int J 
Refugee Law 3 at 4.   
8  At 4. 
9  Bundesrepublik v B and D (joined cases C-57/09 and C-101/09) [2010] ECR I-10979 a para 121.  
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B Refugee  
The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as any person who:10 
 
… owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country …  
 
The difference between ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ status is an important legal 
distinction. While refugees are afforded comprehensive, compulsory protections under 
international law, asylum-seekers are afforded discretionary rather than mandatory 
protection.11 
 
C Internally displace person  
An internally displaced person (IDP) is a person who has not crossed an international 
frontier but has fled from their home.12  
 
The United Nations defines IDPs as:13 
 
… persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave 
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to 
avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of 
human right … and who have not crossed international borders. 
 
  
  
10  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 75 UNTS 287 (opened 
for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950), art 1(A)2. 
11  David A Martin and others Forced Migration: Law and Policy (Thomson/West, Saint Paul, 2007), 
at 71. 
12  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (eds) International Humanitarian Law: Answers 
to your Questions (Focus, Geneva, 2014) at 69. 
13  Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement Com. Hum. Rts. res 1998/50, LIV 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998), art 2. 
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While this Paper focuses on internationally displaced persons, it is worth noting IDPs are 
also protected under International Law, mainly under International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL). Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War14 
(Geneva Convention IV) protects IDPs not taking an active part in hostilities and also 
protects against forcible transfer or displacement in cases where no military necessity 
exists15. 
D Non-refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement prevents a State from returning a person to a territory 
where there is a risk his or her life or freedom would be threatened on the grounds of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion.16  
 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – that has 
a mandate to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and asylum-
seekers – describes non-refoulement as “a cardinal protection principle enshrined in the 
Refugee Convention, to which no reservations are permitted.”17 The UNHCR describes 
the principle of non-refoulement as fundamental for the maintenance of the Human 
Rights Law prohibition on torture and cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.18 
 
Non-refoulement has been described as the “most significant right”19 granted to refugees 
by the 1951 United Nations Convention of the Status of Refugees20 (“the Refugee 
Convention”) and its 1967 Protocol21 (“the Refugee Protocol”), and a “cornerstone of 
international refugee protection”.22 The principle is now so fundamental that the UNHCR 
has called it a jus cogens principle of international law.23  
  
14  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, above n 10. 
15  Art 49. 
16  Art 33. 
17  Note on International Protection GA Note A/AC.95/951, LVI (2001) at [16]. 
18  At [16]. 
19  Gil Loescher, Alexander Betts, and James Milner The politics and practice of refugee protection 
into the twenty-first century (Routledge, New York, 2008) at 15. 
20  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 137 (opened for signature 28 
July 1951, entry into force 22 April 1954). 
21  United Nations Protocol Relating the Status of Refugees 606 UNTS 267 (opened for signature 31 
January 1967, entry into force 4 October 1967). 
22  Loescher and others above, n 19, at 15. 
23  At 16. 
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E State sovereignty 
State sovereignty is a State’s independence and exclusive authority over its territory and 
those who reside in it.24 In excising its State sovereignty, the Parliament of the sovereign 
State is able to “legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights”.25 
 
In relation to refugees and asylum-seekers, “the traditional theory of dichotomy between 
State sovereignty and individual security is often emphasized”,26 as it can weaken the 
ability of a State to decide who is and who is not allowed in its territory.27  
 
A State’s right to accept or deny people to reside in its sovereign zone is one of the oldest 
and most recognised powers of a sovereign State.28 When referring to refugees, the 
interests of the State and the individual needing protection must be reconciled.29 Gil-Baso 
states that this century has witnessed a move away from unfettered State discretion in 
deciding who can enter its territory.30 
 
The boundary of a State’s discretion to allow or deny people onto its territory is relevant 
when examining a host State’s responsibility.31 If one accepts State sovereignty is 
absolute, then a State only owes duties to asylum-seekers if it agrees to this.32 
 
III The situation in Syria 
The conflict in Syria began in March 2011, after a group of 13 year old boys were 
tortured for writing ‘the Government must go!’ on the side of a building in the southern 
city of Der’a. 33  
 
  
24  Christian Henderson “The Arab Spring and the Notion of External State Sovereignty in 
International Law” (2014) 35 Liverpool Law Rev 175 at 175. 
25  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Ex parte Simms) (2000] 2 AC 115 at 131.  
26  Ann Vibeke Eggli Mass Refugee Influx and the Limits of Public International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2002) at 153. 
27  Gil-Baso, above n 7, at 4. 
28  The East India Company v Sandys (1684) 10 ST 371 (KB) at 350. 
29  At 153. 
30  Gil-Baso, above n 7, at 4. 
31  Abu Bakar “State sovereignty: a hindrance to refugee protection (14 April 2010) The Patriotic 
Vanguard <www.thepatrioticvanguard.com>. 
32  Abu Bakar, above. 
33  Lucy Rodger and David Gritten “Syria: the story of the conflict” The BBC (online ed., London, 9 
October 2015). 
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Outraged by the torture, residents of the small town took to the streets to protest and 
demonstrate in favour of democracy.34 The Government responded by allowing security 
forces to open fire on the demonstrators.35 The demonstrations and unrest quickly spread 
around the country, as did the Government response to it. 36 
 
In February 2012 – while the conflict was not yet recognised as a Non-International 
Armed Conflict (NIAC) – the United Nations (UN) General Assembly voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of intervention in Syria. The UN Arab Peace Plan that aimed 
to change the regime in Syria included a call for President Bashar al-Assad to step down. 
However, the Plan was never put into action because China and Russia used their UN 
Security Council veto rights to preclude any intervention, stating the intervention would 
violate Syria’s sovereignty.37  
 
By the middle of 2012, the extent and sustained nature of armed violence between Syrian 
Government forces and a number of well organised non-State groups, led the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to conclude a NIAC was operating in 
Syria, thereby making IHL applicable to the whole country.38 
 
At the time of writing, a NIAC remains in place in Syria. Amnesty International and other 
humanitarian organisations have recorded that grave war crimes and crimes against 
humanity have been committed by both the Government and the opposing forces.39 
 
  
  
34  Rodger and Gritten, above n 33. 
35  Rodger and Gritten, above.   
36  Rodger and Gritten, above.   
37  Paul Harris and others “Syria resolution vetoed by Russia and China at United Nations” The 
Guardian (online ed., New York, 4 February 2012). 
38  ICRC “Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent maintains effort amid increased fighting (press 
release, 17 July 2012). 
39  Amnesty International “War crime in the Syrian conflict” (press release, 7 April 2015). 
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Among the breaches of IHL are indiscriminate shelling of heavily populated civilian 
areas, the use of cluster bombs on civilians, use of weapons in a reckless manner resulting 
in harm to civilians and mass execution of individuals in custody.40 It is also estimated 
about 65,000 people have forcibly disappeared since the violence began, more than 
58,000 of them civilians.41 
 
These and other acts of war have caused widespread international and internal 
displacement, as civilians flee their homes to seek refuge.42 Between January and 
November 2015, the UNHCR estimated European States received 587,060 Syrian asylum 
applications, compared to 137,947 in total in 2014.43 While this Paper focuses on 
international displacement, it is worth noting that more than 6.5 million Syrians are 
estimated to be displaced within Syria.44 
 
IV The Law 
A number of areas of international law apply to the displaced persons and their host State. 
The idea that vulnerable persons require protection during armed conflict is recognised 
under IHL, International Refugee Law and International Human Rights Law.  
 
The Refugee Convention and its Protocol are the primary conventions dictating what the 
relationship between refugee and host State should resemble. While this is not an IHL 
instrument but an International Refugee Law instrument, the two legal areas are 
complimentary in this field. They share one common goal, the protection of lives, health 
and people’s dignity.45 IHL protects civilians during armed conflict while Refugee Law 
protects these same people should the conflict force them to flee their homes.46  
 
  
40  Amnesty International, above n 39. 
41  Amnesty International (ed) “Syria: ‘between prison and the grave’: enforced disappearances in 
Syria” (Amnesty International Publishing, London, November) at 7. 
42  Gouda Ali Gouda Internal Displacement Law and Policy: Analysis of International Norms and 
Domestic Jurisprudence (Vandeplas Publishing, Lake Mary, 2009). 
43  UNHCR “New Asylum Applications lodged in Selected Counties” (10 December 2015) UNHCR 
data sharing portal <www.data.unhcr.org.nz>. 
44  Beth Mitchneck “How to Help Internally Displaced Refugees” Foreign Affairs Magazine (online 
ed., 22 January 2016).  
45  Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ICRC Legal Advisor Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and 
Refugee Law – the Three Pillars (International Association of Refugee Law Judges world 
conference, Stockholm, 21-23 April). 
46  Gillard, above. 
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IHL further compliments Refugee Law in terms of war criminals; anyone considered a 
war criminal under IHL cannot be recognised as a refugee under Refugee Law.47 
 
Apart from the general protection for civilians under IHL, refugees are further protected 
if they are in a State involved in an armed conflict.48 IHL recognises that refugees are 
vulnerable, especially when they are also aliens in another State’s territory and are not 
protected by their State of nationality.49 
 
The analysis of the applicable law aims to canvas the legal instruments that apply to 
displaced Syrians in the EU. The Paper concludes that the majority of displaced Syrians 
are not entitled to protection as recognised refugees under the Refugee Convention. 
However, discretionary protection under a number of other instruments of international 
law is available to them, including Geneva Convention IV50 and Additional Protocol I51, 
the responsibility to protect principle and Human Rights Law. 
A The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol 
The Refugee Convention was born in aftermath of World War II. When this conflict 
ended, European States needed to put mechanisms in place to support the millions of 
people displaced who were unlikely to return to their country of origin.52 The Refugee 
Convention ensured these people were lawfully admitted and integrated into the 
population of their host country and that they had the right to education, employment, 
housing, public relief, social security and access to the Courts.53 
 
The Refugee Convention was originally only intended to protect refugees after the war 
and therefore, only applied to Europeans. The 1967 Protocol later expanded its scope to 
protect people who were displaced across the world.54  
 
A right-wing Dutch politician, Halbe Zijlstra, used the distinction between the Refugee 
Convention and its Protocol to argue this allowed European States to refuse entry for 
  
47  Gillard, above. 
48  ICRC, above n 12, at 69. 
49  At 69. 
50  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, above n 10. 
51  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3 (1977, entered 
into force 7 December 1978).  
52 David A Martin and others, above n 11, at 69. 
53  At 70. 
54  UNHCR The Legal Framework for Protecting Refugees (UNHCR publishing, Geneva, 2011) at 1. 
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Syrian asylum seekers and contravene their obligation under the instruments. Zijlstra 
released a statement saying the Convention and its Protocol should be rendered null and 
void altogether.55  
 
Zijlstra incorrectly argued that only European States had ratified the 1967 Refugee 
Protocol, while the rest of the world did not. The “world can apply for asylum here, but 
not the other way around. We can not [sic] solve the world’s problems in Europe.”56 In 
fact, of the 148 State-parties, 142 States have ratified both the Refugee Convention and 
its Protocol. Madagascar and Saint Kitts and Nevis are the only countries to ratify only 
the Refugee Convention.57  
 
The analysis below will show the majority of displaced Syrians in the EU do not fall 
under the Convention and are therefore not legally entitled to compulsory protection 
under it, making Zijlasta’s argument not only incorrect but also irrelevant. However, 
interestingly, Syria is not a party to either the Refugee Convention or its Protocol and 
while reciprocity is not a requirement under the Convention, it would seem Zijlstra could 
have had a more effective argument had he based it on that concept.  
1 Article 1 
The Refugee Convention and its Protocol define a refugee as a person who is unwilling to 
avail him or herself to the protection of their country of nationality due to a well-founded 
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion (Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention).58 The 
requirement that the persecution occurs for one of the five reasons listed in this Article 
appears to be the reason why a large majority of displaced Syrian persons will not satisfy 
the test, as outlined below. 
  
  
55  Janene Pieters “VVD leader criticized in call to end Refugee Convention” NL Times (online ed., 
21 December 2015). 
56  Pieters, above. 
57  UNHCR “State Parties to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol” (April 2015) Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees <www.unhcr.org>. 
58  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, above n 20, art 1(A)2. 
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(a) Race 
Discrimination based on race is considered one of the most “striking violations of human 
rights … therefore, [it] represents an important element in determining the existence of 
persecution”.59 The UNHCR encourages States to interpret the term ‘race’ as broadly as 
possible. This includes an interpretation covering all kinds of ethnic groups that can be 
loosely referred to as a ‘race’ in common usage.60 The UNHCR has even gone so far as 
to suggest that ‘race’ can be interpreted to include members of a specific social group that 
form a minority within the population.61 
 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad belongs to the Alawites, a Shia sect that makes up 12 
per cent of the population and is a minority group within the mainly Sunni country, who 
make up about 75 per cent of the population.62 While there is definitely a racial element 
to the conflict, in the Middle East it is difficult to separate this from the religious, 
political and ideological elements.63 
 
Whether this racial division is driving discrimination to an extent that it is forcing Syrian 
people to flee their homes is unlikely. It is difficult to understand the exact nature of the 
conflict in Syria, but at the time of writing there is insufficient evidence to suggest people 
are fleeing their homes due to a real threat to their life or freedom on account of race, 
there is also no evidence to suggest they are part of a vulnerable racial minority:64 
 
… the sharpest divide may not so much be religious or ethnic as it is ideological and 
existential, pitting Muslims who want to align politics with religion against those 
who wish to keep them apart. 
  
  
59  UNHCR (ed) Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status (UNHCR Publishing, Geneva, 2012) at [68]. 
60  At [68]. 
61  At [68]. 
62  Lucy Rogers and others “Conflict background” BBC News (online ed, 9 October 2015). 
63  Seth Kaplan “Syria’s Ethnic and Political Division” (2013) Fragile States 
<www.fragilestates.org>.  
64  Kaplan, above. 
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(b) Nationality 
‘Nationality’ in terms of the Refugee Convention overlaps with race and again, it seems 
unlikely discrimination can be proven on this ground.  
(c) Membership of a Social Group 
Under the Refugee Convention, there are two approaches to assessing whether a group of 
people constitutes a ‘social group’, the protected characteristics and the social perception 
approach.65  
 
The protected characteristics approach examines whether a group is united by an 
immutable characteristic so fundamental to human dignity that no person should be 
compelled to forsake it.66 This includes characteristics that are historical and cannot be 
changed and those which, though it is possible to change them, ought not be required to 
change because they are closely linked to the person’s identity or are a fundamental 
human right.67 
 
The social perception approach on the other hand looks at the common characteristics 
that people in a group share and whether these set them apart from society at large.68 
There seems to be some overlap here with the different grounds for discrimination, 
especially when ‘race’ is interpreted in its widest sense as mentioned above.  
 
An example of discrimination based on membership of a social group can be seen in the 
large scale killing, forced disappearance and torture of the educated, wealthy upper class 
that occurred during General Augusto Pinochet’s coup d'état in Chile.69 
  
  
65  Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson “Refugee protection in international law: an overall 
perspective” in Feller, Türk and Nicholson, at 17. 
66  At 17. 
67  UNHCR Guidelines on Protection: Membership of a particular social group HCR/GIP/02/02 at 
[12]. 
68  At [7]. 
69  David Connett, John Hooper and Peter Beaumont “Pinochet arrested in London” The Guardian 
(London, 18 October 1998). 
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In the lead up to the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, President Assad introduced neo-
liberal economic measures to bolster the urban middle class, to increase the opportunities 
for corruption and suppress the rural majority of mainly small agriculture producers.70 
This could potentially be persecution under the social perceptions test. However, it 
appears to fall short of meeting the full test under Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, 
because there is no evidence this is causing the widespread displacement of Syrians. 
(d) Political opinion 
This category relates to persons who are persecuted because they hold a political opinion 
that differs to that of the ruling party, especially when this opinion is critical of those in 
power.71 
 
The UNHCR suggests some individuals who have been openly critical of the Assad 
regime have disappeared.72 At the time of publication, a number of civil society activists, 
human rights defenders, journalists, humanitarian workers and Syrian civilians remain in 
arbitrary detention without trial, because they have criticised the ruling party.73 
 
A number of Syrians on both sides of the conflict have also fled to the EU to desert the 
army.74 It seems defectors are the types of people this Article attempts to protect and for 
this relatively small group this may give rise to recognition as a genuine refugee.  
(e) Religion 
The protection from discrimination on religious grounds is based on the idea that all 
individuals should have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
including the right to manifest in public or in private any religious teaching, practice, 
worship or observance. 75 
 
  
70  Nick Danforth and Graham Pitts “The Syrian War and Sectarianism” (blog, 6 December 2013) 
Dissent Magazine <www.dissent.org>. 
71  UNHCR, above n 59, at [80]. 
72  Amnesty International “Syria: ‘between prison and the grave’: enforced disappearances in Syria”, 
above n 41, at 7. 
73  Human Rights Watch “World Report 2015: Syria” (online ed, New York, 2015). 
74  Christopher Lee “Syrian Exodus” (22 December 2015) The Ground Truth Project 
<www.thegroundtruthproject.org>. 
75  UNHCR, above n 59, at [71]. 
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There is undoubtedly a religious element to the conflict in Syria, Islam in the Middle East 
is not simply a religion, it is also a way of life, so it would be practically impossible for it 
not to be an influencing factor.76 Again, this overlaps with both the nationality and the 
race category, as religious lines often coincide and blur with racial lines. 77  
 
In Syria, persecution on religious grounds comes coupled with a stronger political 
element.78 Many of the parties fighting in the conflict are divided along political and 
religious lines.79 Alongside this, there are further divisions within the religious groups, 
for example, the educated urban Sunni population and the rural Sunni agricultural 
workers.80 
 
While this Paper does not attempt to give an outline of the complex religious and racial 
divides within Syria and the Middle East, it is worth noting that the nature of this conflict 
potentially gives rise to two grounds of persecution under the Refugee Convention: 
political opinion and religion. Despite this, the main factor that appears to contribute to 
the displacement of Syrians is indiscriminate attacks on civilians – itself a war crime – 
but not a ground that places a duty on States to offer protection to the individuals.   
(f) Fear of persecution 
While it is suggested that displaced Syrians will fall short of falling into one of the five 
categories under Article 1, it is worth considering the other requirement under the Article 
to give a better understanding of how it operates. This fear of persecution requirement 
under Article 1 is vague and exactly how it should be interpreted has been widely debated 
since it was introduced.81 It seems a relatively well-established notion that the word 
‘persecution’ is central to determining whether an individual falls within the ambit of 
‘refugee’ under the Refugee Convention. 
 
  
76  William T Cavanaugh The myth of religious violence: Secular ideology and the roots of modern 
conflict (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) at 26. 
77  Kaplan, above n 63. 
78  Armenak Tokmajan “Religious Leaders, and Violence in the Conflict in Syria” (October 2015) 
Fragile States <www.fragilestates.org>. 
79  Tokmajan, above. 
80  Kaplan, above 63. 
81  Eiko Theilemann “In need of a burden sharing approach: Ensuring fair and human asylum policies 
in the EU” (blog post, 22 January 2016) British Law and Policy, London School of Economics and 
Political Science <www.blogs.lse.ac.uk>. 
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Dr Weis in his analysis of the Refugee Convention’s Travaux Preparatoires suggests the 
well-founded fear of persecution should be an established legal threshold, investigated 
through the analysis of objective facts.82  While no exact test is recorded in the Refugee 
Convention or its preparatory material, the judicial view seems to be that it should 
involve injurious or oppressive action.83 
 
The House of Lords (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Sivakumaran84) confirmed the test to establish a ‘well founded fear of persecution’ 
involved an analysis of whether a reasonable possibility of persecution would occur, 
should the person return to their country of origin (emphasis added).85 In that case, the 
Court found the Secretary of State was able to take all relevant facts and circumstances 
into account when considering an application for refugee status, including ones not 
known to the applicant.86 Based on evidence that there had been no persecution of Tamils 
generally or of any specific group of Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Secretary of State rejected 
six Sri Lankan Tamils’ refugee applications.87 
 
One of the other leading tests comes from the United States’ case Ghaly v Immigration 
and Naturalization Services88. In Ghaly, the Court held that the persecution faced must be 
“both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable”.89  
  
  
82  Dr Paul Weis “The Refugee Convention – the Travaux Preparatoires analysed with a commentary 
by Dr Paul Weis” (1990) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees <www.unhcr.org> at 7.  
83  At 8. 
84  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] 2 WLR 92 (HL). 
85  Weis, above n 82, at 8. 
86  Sivakumaran, above n 83, per Lord Goff of Chieveley. 
87  Weis, above n 82, at 8. 
88  Ghaly v Immigration Naturalization Services 58 F3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir 1995).  
89  At [II]. 
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While the individual characteristics of the asylum-seekers are not yet known, the general 
consensus seems to be that the majority of Syrians seeking asylum in the EU are fleeing 
armed conflict in their country of origin.90 Again, it appears that while the war crimes are 
both ‘subjectively genuine’ and ‘objectively reasonable’, there are no grounds to argue 
there is ‘subjectively genuine’ and ‘objectively reasonable’ persecution resulting from 
these war crimes. This appears to leads to the conclusion that the displaced persons do 
not satisfy the test in Ghaly.  
 
The Refugee Convention has been widely criticised for this narrow interpretation of 
‘refugee’, especially because it does not include persons persecuted against because of 
gender or sexual orientation.91 But most importantly, as the above example shows, the 
Refugee Convention does not provide protection for civilians fleeing the general dangers 
of war or more specifically, those fleeing war crimes and crimes against humanity.92  It 
appears that this is where the Refugee Convention fails to protect the majority of 
displaced Syrians.  
2 Protection  
If a person is recognised as a genuine refugee under the Refugee Convention, this 
instrument imparts a range of protective principles on them. This includes being entitled 
to the same treatment as nationals in areas such as, being able to access the Courts93; the 
right to employment94; the right to elementary education95; access to public relief and 
assistance96; and the right to be issued identity papers97. 
  
  
90  Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich The European Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis – 
What Next? (MPC, San Domenico di Fiesole, 2014) at 4. 
91  Petter Hojem “Fleeing for love: asylum seekers and sexual orientation in Scandinavia” (Research 
Paper, UNHCR, Geneva, 2009) at 5. 
92  Mélanie Jacques Armed Conflict and Displacement: the Protection of Refugees and Displaced 
Persons under International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) at 
157. 
93  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, above n 20, art 16. 
94  Art 17. 
95  Art 22. 
96  Art 23. 
97  Art 27. 
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3 Article 33 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention says that no contracting State shall expel or return 
(refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to a territory where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on “account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”98 This principle is considered “the modern-
day linchpin of refugee protection”.99 
 
The Article places a negative duty on Member States not to refouler the individual to his 
or her country of origin.100 However, it does not impose a positive duty on the State to 
offer the person asylum or to give him or her work authorisation or residency status.101 
Nor does it require the host State to allow the individual to stay in its sovereign zone; it 
only requires that the host State does not send the individual to the country where their 
life or freedom is threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.102  
 
Article 1 assesses whether ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ exists, whereas Article 33 
assesses whether the person’s life or freedom is ‘threatened’.103 The first requirement 
seems to include a more objective element, whereas the second is more subjective. This 
could suggest the test for refouler of a person already on another country’s soil is less 
stringent than the test for recognition as a refugee. 
 
The Refugee Convention does not place a positive duty on Member States to provide 
asylum for people who are recognised as refugees under Article 1.104 It does, however, 
prevent the refoulement of people who are already on a member State’s territory under 
Article 33.105  
  
  
98  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, above n 20, art 33. 
99  Martin and others, above n 11, at 70. 
100  At 69. 
101  At 70. 
102  At 70. 
103  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, above n 20, art 1 and art 31. 
104  Martin and others, above 11, at 71. 
105  Bill Frelick “Paradigm Shifts in International Responses to Refugees” in James D White and 
Anthony J Marsella (eds) Fear of Persecution: Global Human Rights, International Law, and 
Human Well-Being (Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2007) 33 at 38. 
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Again, the test for non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention requires the individual 
to show a threat to their life or freedom on the five grounds discussed above. Although 
other internal law safeguards against refouler exist, a closed reading of the Refugee 
Convention seems to suggest this would be a possible option that EU host States could 
consider. 
B The Refugee Convention and the Syrian situation 
The lack of genuine grounds for recognition as a refugee under the Refugee Convention, 
does not automatically suggest States do not need to offer the displaced persons any 
protection, rather is merely means States are not required to recognise them as a refugees. 
As explained below, a number of other instruments deal with the responsibilities owed to 
displaced persons and these outline duties – mainly discretionary – that States may have 
towards persons not recognised as refugees. 
 
The original Convention was drafted more than 60 years ago and to interpret and apply it 
effectively in the twenty-first century, it appears that one must give consideration to the 
vastly different global landscape we have now. Applying Refugee Law is a delicate 
process and the law must allow for, and be applicable to, vastly differing circumstances. 
106  
 
While the Refugee Convention’s wording and intention is direct, in practice EU States 
have granted asylum to people who are not recognised under the Convention (examples 
are discussed in the case law below).107 This does not breach the Refugee Convention, 
rather this instrument merely outlines when a State must recognise an individual as a 
refugee and consequently owes a duty to them; it is not concerned with when a State may 
offer protection to a displaced person.108 
  
  
106  María-Teresa Gil-Baso, above n 7, at 5.   
107  At 5.   
108  At 6. 
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C Exceptions to recognition as a refugee  
There are situations where the law prohibits a person from being recognised as a refugee. 
Serious breaches of IHL are considered war crimes that States must prosecute either in 
their own courts or by handing the individual over to another State.109 In situations where 
war criminals and witnesses for proceedings in the International Court of Justice seek 
asylum or apply for refugee status, IHL and Refugee Law overlap.110 
 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention precludes the Convention from applying to persons 
for whom there are serious reasons to consider they have committed a war crime, a crime 
against the peace or a crime against humanity.111 The motivation behind this Article is to 
prevent the very people who created the refugees from claiming the right of refuge.112 
Article 1F also prevents people from claiming refugee status if there is reason to suspect 
the person has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior 
to being admitted to that country113, or has been guilty of acts contrary to the purpose and 
principle of the United Nations114. 
 
Under Article 1F(a) people who have committed war crimes, crimes against peace or 
crimes against humanity, as defined in the international instruments listing these 
provision, are precluded from applying for refugee status.115 The international 
instruments this Article refers to are found in IHL, for example the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols and more recently, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court 1998, which establishes the International Criminal Court and defines the 
four main international crimes.116 IHL and Refugee Law share a similar objective, 
namely holding war criminals to account for their actions.117  
  
109  ICRC, above n 12, at 95. 
110  Fannie Lafontaine, Joseph Rikhof, Laurel Baig “Special Issue: the interaction between Refugee 
Law and International Criminal Justice” (2014) 12 J Int Criminal Justice 901 at 910. 
111  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, above n 20, art 1F(a).  
112  Ella Watt “International Criminal Law and New Zealand Refugee Status Determinations: a Case 
Note on Attorney General v Tamil X (2012) 43 VUWLR 235 at 240. 
113  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, above n 20, art 1F(b). 
114  Art 1F(c). 
115  Art 1F(a). 
116  ICRC, above n 12, at 6. 
117  Ned Djodjevic “Exclusions under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention” 12 J Int Criminal 
Justice 901 at 1058. 
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1 Article 1F(a) 
IHL is based on the assumption that people who commit war crimes must be held 
accountable for this. An integral part of this includes ensuring they are not able to claim 
asylum in a third country, Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention recognises and 
embodies this long-held objective.118 It also recognises the whole international 
community has an interest in ensuring those who commit genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity are brought to justice.119 While the International Criminal Court has a 
mandate to bring people who commit these crimes to justice, sovereign States retain the 
ability to prosecute these people under domestic law.120 
 
The motivation of the drafters of the Refugee Convention to include this sub-article 
appears self-evident. It seems possible a war criminal would try to seek refuge in a third 
country, either to prevent retribution in the country where he or she had committed those 
crimes or to evade detection. When a war criminal faces retribution, it raises a 
complicated conundrum. Article 1 F precludes the individual from protection as a refugee 
under the Refugee Convention and consequently, the person is not entitled to protection 
from refouler under Article 33. It would, however, appear to be against morality to return 
these persons to their host country if they could face torture or death there. 
 
Applying the exceptions to the protection under the Refugee Convention is complicated 
in practice. Since 2011, Amnesty International has been monitoring the Syrian conflict, 
talking to citizens in an attempt to get names of the perpetrators of war crimes.121 
However, it will be many years – if at all – before these people are brought before the 
International Criminal Court or a specialist tribunal set up to assess Syrian war crimes.122  
  
  
118  Dennis McNamara “the Protection of Refugees and the Responsibility of States: Engagement of 
Abdication?” 11 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 355 at 359. 
119  David McGregor “Bringing War Criminals to Justice in Australia: Upholding international 
criminal law and the principle of non-refoulement” (2007) 32 Alt LJ 154 at 154. 
120  At 154. 
121  Amnesty International, above n 41, at 7. 
122  Amnesty International, above n 41, at 7. 
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The Netherlands faced a similar situation near the end of last century. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, the Netherlands opened its borders to many people displaced by conflict 
around the word, including a large number from Afghanistan.123 However, it was later 
discovered that not only civilians arrived in the Netherlands from Afghanistan; senior 
Government officials, including members of the Afghani Secret Service – the KhAD – 
who were responsible for grave war crimes and crimes against humanity, had also sought 
asylum.124  
 
In response to a Dutch media investigation that found at least 35 Afghan people 
suspected of committing war crimes living in the Netherlands, the Government set up the 
unit 1F (named after the Article of the Refugee Convention to which is relates) as a 
special unit within the Immigratie-en Naturaliedienst (Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service, part of the Ministry of Justice).125 The unit 1F uses specially trained 
international law experts, information from non-government organisations, and 
intelligence gathered by Buitenlandse Zaken (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to assess 
whether someone could potentially have committed war crimes in their country of 
origin.126 This includes, amongst other things, greater scrutiny of individuals who have 
served in the armed forces.127 
 
Should a similar unit be set up for Syrian asylum-seekers, it seems unlikely any 
intelligence allowing European authorities to investigate Syrian individuals suspected 
under Article 1F(a) will be available in the near future.128  
  
  
123  Leslie Haskell “EU asylum and war criminals: no place to hide” (Blog post, 18 September 2014) 
EU Observer <www.euobserver.com>. 
124  Leslie Haskell, above. 
125  Immigratie-en Naturaliedienst “Nederland geen vluchthaven voor plegers van oorlogsmisdaden 
(the Netherlands will not be a haven for war criminals)” (2015) Immigratie-en Naturaliedienst 
<www.ind.nl>. 
126  Immigratie-en Naturaliedienst, above 
127  Immigratie-en Naturaliedienst, above. 
128  Kenneth Roth “Ending Syria’s Atrocities is a Prerequisite to Ending its War” Human Rights Watch 
(online ed., 20 January 2016). 
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For the exclusion to be applied, individual criminal responsibility must be established for 
one of the excluded acts under Article 1F.129 The test for individual responsibility 
includes establishing whether the person committed or made substantial contributions to 
the acts, with knowledge the acts constituted a criminal offence.130 These sorts of 
investigations often take years, if not decades, and require vast resources.131 For example, 
in the Netherlands an ex-Afghan war criminal was arrested in October 2015 for crimes 
committed in the Afghan province of Kunar on 30 April 1979.132 The suspect had come 
to the Netherlands in 1990, where he was granted asylum and later citizenship, and he 
had lived in Rotterdam for 25 years before his arrest.133 
 
When a person does not fall under the Refugee Convention – as it is argued the majority 
of the Syrians do not – it normally follows they do not fall under its exceptions either. 
This could mean a potential war criminal, who would ordinarily not be recognised as a 
refugee, will also not fall under the exceptions to refugee status under Article 1 F. While 
it remains to be seen how this will apply in practice in regards to the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis, it raises questions about what exactly this will entail for these people.  
 
To address this and make it easier to ensure war criminals are apprehended, EU States 
could consider implementing domestic or EU legislation allowing for the prosecution of 
these people under domestic law, similar to Australia. 
 
Australia has introduced extra domestic legislation – The War Crimes Amendment Act 
1988 – to prevent war criminals from gaining asylum there.134 The Act allows the 
domestic criminal justice system to place people residing in Australia on trial for war 
crimes. The domestic justice system has the power to denaturalise and deport the persons 
(if found guilty), without needing to wait for the international courts.135  
 
  
129  UNHCR (ed) “Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention” (Statement, Geneva, 2009) at 9. 
130  At 9. 
131  Roth, above n 128. 
132  Openbaar Miniterie (Office of the Public Prosecutor - the Netherlands) “Afghan war crimes 
suspect arrested in the Netherlands” (press release, 30 October 2015). 
133  Openbaar Miniterie, above. 
134  McGregor, above n 119, at 155. 
135  At 155. 
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Introducing similar legislation could ensure war criminals are not granted discretionary 
asylum (given they are not apprehended) or if they are, that this can be easily revoked and 
could ensure war criminals are prosecuted in a more timely manner.136  
 
EU States could also consider a hybrid domestic-international model that could allow 
them to work efficiently to ensure war criminals are not able to seek refuge for a long 
period.137 Alongside the benefits mentioned above, this model can combine staffing, 
operative law, structure, financing, and rules of procedure and bridge the gap between 
domestic criminal justice proceedings and the International Criminal Court, ensuring a 
timelier and financially viable process.138 
 
EU States could also consider enforcing a more rigorous vetting scheme, such as that 
imposed in the Netherlands. However, without much information available to anyone 
regarding the situation in Syria and given the sheer volume of people arriving every day, 
it seems difficult to establish what exactly a competent vetting scheme would look like 
and how it would operate.  
2 Article 1F (b) 
Under Article 1F(b), a person will not be recognised as a refugee if he or she has 
committed a “serious non-political crime outside his country of refuge prior to his 
admission to that country as a refugee.”139 
 
It has been suggested that any crime “characterized as criminal by the receiving State’s 
legal system is adequate to raise the possibility of exclusion”.140 This gives the host State 
wide discretion to decide whether any crime under its criminal code is both ‘serious’ and 
‘non-political’.141  
  
  
136  Beth Van Schaack “International Justice Year-in-Review: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards 
(Part 2)” Just Security (online ed., January 19 2016). 
137  Schaack, above. 
138  Schaack, above. 
139  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, above n 20, art 1F(b). 
140  Djodjevic, above n 117, at 1060. 
141  At 1060. 
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It has also been argued the crime should be one of the crimes listed in Article 1F(a), for 
example, war crimes and crimes against humanity.142 “These are seen as crimes which 
attack the fundamental values of the international community by compromising the 
peace, security and well-being of the world as a whole.”143 However, in defining 
‘serious’ and ‘non-political’ crimes as crimes already listed in the first subsection, these 
commentators appear to be making Article 1F(b) obsolete and this gives rise to questions 
regarding its relevance at all. 
 
Interestingly that this Article only applies to people who have committed a crime outside 
their host country, meaning that people who commit crimes within their host country can 
technically still be recognised as a ‘refugee’. This is particularly topical in terms of the 
current situation in the EU, where a number of high-profile crimes have been linked to 
Syrians asylum-seekers. For example, the Paris bombing on 13 November 2015144 and 
the mass assault on women on New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne.145  
 
The intention behind including ‘non-political’ crime is discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
 
(a) Attorney-General v Tamil X (2010) 
The Supreme Court of New Zealand recently dealt with the exceptions for refugee status 
under Article 1F(a) and (b) in Attorney-General v Tamil X.146 In this case, the Applicant 
was convicted and served three years in an Indian prison for transporting explosives for 
the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers.147 This group was responsible for at least 20 attacks 
between 1985 and 1996, mainly against civilians.148 X argued that he was unaware of 
what he was transporting.149 
 
  
142   Djodjevic, above n 117, at 1060. 
143  At 1061.  
144  Inti Landauro, Matthew Dalton and Adam Entous “Paris attacks: Syrian migrant was amongst the 
bombers” The Wall Street Journal (online ed., Paris, 14 November 2015). 
145  Emma Graham-Harrison “Cologne Protest over sex attacks” The Guardian (online ed., Cologne, 9 
January 2016). 
146  Attorney General v Tamil X [2010] NZSC 107. [2011] 1 NZLR 721. 
147  At [7] – [10]. 
148  At [49]. 
149  At [17]. 
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The Court held it was up to the person applying for refugee status to prove they had a 
claim and, if necessary, that Article 1F did not apply to them (emphasis added).150 The 
reverse burden of proof approach was later criticised and considered inconsistent with 
international jurisprudence.151 
 
In considering whether X had committed war crimes under 1F(a), the Court looked to 
IHL, specifically the Rome Statute. The Court confirmed that when interpreting the 
Refugee Convention, it was not “confined to international instruments existing at the time 
of making of the Convention”.152 Therefore, even though the Rome Statute was drafted 
nearly 50 years after the Refugee Convention, it could be used to interpret the earlier 
document.153  
 
The Court assessed whether X was guilty of crimes against humanity under Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute due to complicity under Article 25 and 30. In assessing whether X was 
complicit or had joint enterprise-liability, the Court stressed that refugee-status decision 
makers should adopt an approach that:154 
 
… fully reflects the principle that those who contribute significantly to the 
commission of an international crime with the stipulated intention, although not 
direct perpetrators of it, are personally responsible for the crime. 
 
So even if one of the displaced Syrians in the EU could establish that he or she meets the 
stringent criteria for recognition as a genuine refugee, if they could be linked to a war 
crime under IHL, this would automatically preclude them from receiving any protection 
from their host State.155 In Tamil X, the Court found that he was not precluded under 
Article 1F(a) or (b), because the crime he committed was a political one, accordingly the 
Court referred the case back to the Refugee Status Appeals Authority for review.156 
  
  
150  At [43]. 
151  Watt, above n 112, at 244. 
152  Attorney General v Tamil X, above n 146, at [47] 
153  At [47] 
154  At [70]. 
155  At [47] 
156  At [101]. 
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The Court also explained the intention behind Article 1F(b) is two-fold. It ensures that 
those who commit serious non-political crimes do not avoid prosecution by claiming 
protection under the Convention.157 Secondly, it protects a host State’s security by not 
obliging it to offer protection to an individual who has shown a propensity to commit 
serious non-political crimes.158  
 
The exception for non-political crimes dates back to the nineteenth century.159 Its purpose 
was to give host States the option to refuse extradition of a political dissident who faced 
an unfair trial or excessive punishment.160 While the political crime the person was 
accused of committing could be serious, the drafters of the Convention believed it 
unlikely the person would commit a similar crime in their country of refuge.161  
 
Tamil X provides a good example of the interaction of Refugee Law, IHL and domestic 
law.   
D Exceptions to non-refoulement 
Although a person will not be precluded from refugee status and protection from their 
host State if they commit crimes there, they can be prevented from benefiting from the 
principle of non-refoulement.162 Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention states:163 
 
[t]he benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.  
  
  
157  At [82]. 
158  At [82]. 
159  Attorney General v Tamil X, above n 146, at [85]. 
160  At [85]. 
161  At [82]. 
162  Weis, above n 82, at 237. 
163  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, above n 10, art 33(2). 
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The exceptions to non-refoulement must be separated from the exceptions under Article 
1F. Article 1F forms part of the definition of ‘refugee’, whereas Article 33(2) does not 
form a part of the definition nor does it provide a ground for exclusion from protection 
under the Refugee Convention.164 Article 1F aims to protect the integrity of the host State 
while Article 33(2) aims to protect the security of the host State by allowing the 
withdrawal of the protection under the principle of non-refoulement in certain 
circumstances.165 
 
Article 33(2) appears quite vague as it does not give guidance as to what the test for 
‘reasonable grounds’ is, what can be regarded a ‘danger to the security’ and how serious 
a ‘serious crime’ should be. 
 
The motivation behind this sub-Article is to ensure people do not abuse the right to 
asylum.166 Dr Weis states the wording was purposefully drafted in a vague manner to 
allow “the State to decide whether the danger entailed to refugees by expulsion outweighs 
the menace to public security if they were permitted to stay.”167 
 
As with any large group of people, it would be foolish to assume there are no criminally 
minded persons amongst displaced Syrians. For example, in Germany, over 30,000 
Syrian displaced arrived in November 2015 alone, or equivalent to just over 1,000 people 
per day.168 
 
At the time of writing, European leaders are investigating the option to impose tougher 
sentences, including deportation for asylum-seekers who commit serious crimes within 
their host country.169As more people arrive, the general consensus appears to be pointing 
to a model whereby the duties of States towards the displaced persons come coupled with 
duties of the individuals seeking asylum.  
  
164  UNHCR, above n 129, at 8. 
165  At 8. 
166  Weis, above n 82, at 237. 
167  At 237. 
168  UNHCR “New Asylum Applications lodged in Selected Counties” (10 December 2015) UNHCR 
data sharing portal <www.data.unhcr.org.nz>. 
169  Kate Connolly “Angela Merkel seeks tougher laws to deport migrants after Cologne sex attacks” 
The Guardian (online ed., Berlin, 9 January 2016). 
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E  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 170 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva 
Convention IV) protects civilians, or persons taking no active part in hostilities, including 
members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms.171  
 
The Convention lists the minimum standards that parties to the conflict must abide by, 
including a prohibition on murder, violence, taking hostages and outrages on personal 
dignity.172 As civilians in the conflict zone, Syrian IDPs who are taking no active part in 
hostilities are afforded protection against these prohibited acts under Geneva Convention 
IV.173 
 
In terms of the internationally displaced Syrians, Geneva Convention IV lays down 
explicit rules in IHL concerning the relationship between refugees and their host State on 
the one hand and with their State of origin on the other.174 
 
Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV defines a ‘protected person’ as:175 
 
 … those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, 
in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. 
 
As it currently stands, Syrians are not ‘protected persons’ under Geneva Convention IV 
unless they are in the hands of a party to the conflict.176 Therefore, civilians on the 
territory of a neutral host State, as the Syrians in the EU are, are not ‘protected 
persons’.177  
  
  
170  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, above n 10. 
171  Art 3(1). 
172  Art 3(1). 
173  Art 3(1). 
174  Jacques, above n 92, at 159. 
175  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, above n 10, art 4. 
176  Jacques, above n 92, at 159. 
177  At 159. 
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Determining exactly who ‘protected persons’ are under Article 4 of Geneva Convention 
IV can be complex, but the general consensus points to the idea that displaced persons 
cannot claim the benefits of a ‘protected person’ under the Convention.178 The 
Commentary for the Convention suggests that displaced persons were considered during 
its drafting, “the Rapporteur to Committee III pointed out that it thus complied with the 
recommendation made to the Diplomatic Conference by the representative of the 
International Refugee Organization”.179 However, the Commentary later concedes some 
speakers pointed out that the term ‘nationals’ did not cover all cases, “in particular cases 
where men and women had fled from their homeland and no longer considered 
themselves, or were no longer considered to be nationals of that country.”180 
 
Article 44 of the Convention on the other hand deals specifically with refugees and 
makes this clear by using the term ‘refugee’.181 The Article outlines that a State party to 
the conflict shall not treat refugees on its territory as enemy aliens.182  
 
Under Article 44, the term ‘refugee’ is not defined, but the Commentary suggests it 
should be given a wide interpretation - a wider interpretation than under the Refugee 
Convention.183 While the Article does not place any positive duties on States beyond not 
identifying refugees as enemies, the Commentary suggests that State parties should 
interpret it “in the broadest humanitarian spirit, in order that the maximum use may be 
made of the resources it offers for the protection of refugees.”184  
 
To claim protection under the Article, a person must be seeking asylum in a country that 
is at war with their country of origin.185 While the United Kingdom and France are 
assisting the United States with bombing operations in Syria, the countries cannot really 
be considered parties to the conflict,186 therefore making it unlikely Syrians can claim the 
protection of this Article.  
  
178  Jean de Preux Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC Publishing, 
Geneva, 1958) at 46. 
179  At 46 
180  At 46.  
181  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, above n 10, art 44. 
182  Art 44. 
183  de Preux, above n 178, at 265 
184  At 265 
185  At 264. 
186  Ghadi Sary “Syria conflict: Who are the groups fighting Assad?” BBC News (online ed., 11 
November 2015). 
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Even if protection could be claimed under the Article, no guidance is given as to exactly 
what this protection would entail. The Commentary suggests that the Article was left 
ambiguous on purpose, so plethora of possible modes of protection could fall under it.187 
It was never intended to be a blanket protection for all refugees and the Article recognises 
that refugees can pose a threat to the security of a State.188  Therefore, the Article is not 
considered to be a protection against all forms of security measures such as internment.189 
There is no evidence to suggest that refugees should be entitled to work or be given 
citizenship in their host State either.190 
 
As mentioned above, Geneva Convention IV distinguishes between the protection that all 
civilians are entitled to and what ‘protected persons’ are entitled to, that is civilians who 
are not nationals of the Power they find themselves in the hands of.191 The second group 
of people is entitled: respect for the person (Article 27 Geneva Convention IV), humane 
treatment (Article 31 Geneva Convention IV) and protection from deportation (Article 41 
Geneva Convention IV). 
 
While it is not generally accepted that refugees are automatically recognised as ‘protected 
persons’, Jacques argues all displaced persons should be afforded this status under 
Geneva Convention IV.192 She suggests that the Convention as it is currently drafted does 
not adequately protect or take into account people who have fled their own country but do 
not enjoy the protection of their State of origin.193 
 
Jacques bases this argument on the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal on 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) case Prosecutor v Tadić.194 
  
  
187  de Preux, above n 178, at 265. 
188  At 264. 
189  At 264. 
190  At 264. 
191  Jean de Preux Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987) at 847. 
192  Jacques, above n 92, at 160. 
193  Jacques, above n 92, at 160. 
194  Prosecutor v Tadić ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-94-1-A 1 at [164 – 165]. 
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The section of Tadić Jacques uses to argue this point looks at the example of the legal 
bonds of nationality afforded to the refugees of German Jewish ancestry who had fled to 
France and were on French territory when Germany invaded. 195  The judgment in Tadić 
suggests these people should be ‘protected persons’ as they no longer benefitted from the 
normal diplomatic protection of their host State or State of origin.196 The Tribunal goes 
on to suggest that the main purpose of Geneva Convention IV is the protection of 
civilians “who do not enjoy the diplomatic protection, and correlatively are not subject to 
the allegiance and control, of the State in whose hands they may find themselves”.197 
 
Although the Tribunal in Tadić is referring to victims who were within their own country 
of nationality but were being persecuted there, Jacques suggests this quote should be used 
to create a wider ‘substance of relations’ doctrine. This doctrine would class civilians 
who are outside their country of nationality – but not on the territory of a party to the 
conflict, including civilians internationally displaced due to a NIAC – as ‘protected 
persons’, therefore granting them the protection under Geneva Convention IV, no matter 
where they are. 
 
Article 45 of Geneva Convention IV provides protection against refoulement for 
‘protected persons’: 198  
 In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a country where he 
or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or 
religious beliefs.  
  
  
195  Jacques, above n 92, at 160.  
196  Tadić, above n 194, at [165]. 
197  At [168]. 
198  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, above n 10, art 45. 
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F Geneva Convention Protocol Additional I 1977 
After the introduction of the 1949 instrument, the ICRC expressed concern that it did not 
adequately protect refugees, especially those considered ‘stateless’.199 To address this, 
Article 73 of Additional Protocol I was introduced to apply to persons whom:200 
 
 … before the beginning of hostilities, were considered as stateless persons or 
refugees under the relevant international instruments accepted by the Parties 
concerned or under the national legislation of the State of refuge or State of 
residence …  
 
This eliminated the requirement for diplomatic relations between the asylum-seeker’s 
host country and the country of origin.201  However, it does not appear the introduction of 
this Additional Protocol in 1977 means more internationally displaced Syrians are 
protected by the instrument in 2016. 
 
Despite broadening the group of people protected by Geneva Convention IV, Additional 
Protocol I did not extend its protection to include people who were not recognised by the 
existing relevant international instruments – most notably the Refugee Convention and 
any other “instruments containing a definition of refugees or stateless persons”.202 It also 
does not extend protection to persons not considered refugees before the hostilities 
began.203 As outlined above, the majority of Syrian asylum-seekers will probably not 
qualify for refugee status under the Refugee Convention and consequently, do not meet 
the first requirement under Article 73 of Additional Protocol. Secondly, they are fleeing 
armed conflict, meaning they were not considered ‘stateless’ before the hostilities began. 
  
  
199  Jacques, above, n 92, at 160 
200  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, above n 51, art 73.  
201  de Preux “Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949”, above n 191, at 845. 
202  At 849. 
203  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, above n 51, art 73. 
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The Commentary suggests the first requirement was expressly drafted to ensure States 
were only bound by instruments they had formally agreed to.204 The second requirement 
ensured the protection only applied to those escaping persecution not directly related to 
the conflict and did not apply to people escaping the general horrors of war.205 The 
reason given for this at the time of drafting was to avoid encouraging acts of treason or 
desertion.206 
 
Interestingly, during the consultation, the Syrian representative particularly deplored the 
fact that the protection afforded by this provision was not extended to include civilians 
who were fleeing from an armed conflict.207  
G Human Rights Law 
One of the problems faced when applying the Refugee Convention is that the political, 
legal and social setting worldwide has altered considerably since 1951. The overall 
population alone has increased by more than 5 billion people.208 Some areas of 
international law have developed to reflect the changes, especially international Human 
Rights Law. 
 
Where the Conventions mentioned above have failed to protect individuals, Human 
Rights Law has been used as a means to circumvent the stringent requirements under 
those instruments. 209 This approach has been particularly popular in Europe, where the 
Courts have opted to apply Human Rights Law instead of the Refugee Convention or 
Geneva Convention, in an attempt to protect an individual who would otherwise not be 
protected.210  
  
  
204  de Preux “Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949”, above n 191, at 849. 
205  Jacques, above 92, at 161. 
206  At 161. 
207  At 162. 
208  Martin De Wulf “Population Pyramids of the World” (October 2015) Population Pyramid 
<www.populationpyramid.net>.  
209  Jacques, above n 92, at 178. 
210  See for example, M.S.S v Belgium and Greece (30696/09) Grand Chamber, ECHR, 21 January 
2011.  
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Whether this will be a continuing trend in the EU that will be applied to displaced Syrians 
remains to be seen, but it appear there is a possibility that given the shortage of resources 
and the sheer volume of people, this practice may cease to be as prevalent. However, the 
following instruments will continue to operate. 
1 European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms211 tries to maintain an effective political democracy through a common 
understanding and observance of the Human Rights on which this depends.212 All EU 
Member States are party to the Convention.213 
 
Article 2 states everyone’s right to life will be protected by law, apart from if the person 
is convicted for a crime for which the death penalty is available.214 
 
Article 3 prohibits “inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment”.215 There are no 
exceptions or limitations on this right.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has said Article 3 implicitly prevents a party to the 
Refugee Convention from returning a person to a country where there is a real risk that 
the person could face inhumane treatment, this includes war crimes against civilians.216  
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights217 (ICCPR) recognises the equal 
and inalienable rights of all people are “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world”. 218 
  
211  Council of Europe “European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms” CETS No.005 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 
1953), introduction. 
212  Introduction. 
213  Luc Leboeuf and Evangelia Tsourdi “Towards a Re-definition of Persecution? Assessing the 
Potential Impact of Y and Z” (2013) 2 E.H.R.L.R 402 at 403. 
214  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, above n 
211, art 2. 
215  Art 3.  
216  Jacques, above n 92, at 178. 
217  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 
(opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976).  
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Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment.219 
  
The UNHCR insists this right allows for no limitations or derogation, not even in 
situations of public emergency.220 The UNHCR has also suggested that ICCPR prevents 
State parties from “exposing individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their 
extradition, expulsion or refoulement”.221 
 
If the UNHCR’s Commentary is accepted as binding, not even a public emergency will 
allow for derogation from the right.222 This would suggest that not even large-scale 
disturbances, for example a terror attack, will act as a sufficient objective to return of 
Syrian asylum-seekers to Syria. 
H Other international law instruments 
3 The Dublin II Regulation 
The Dublin II Regulation223 technically applies to all EU Member States. It dictates that 
applications for refugee status must be processed – with some exceptions – by the 
country where the individual first entered the EU. 224  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
218  ICCPR, above n 217, Preamble.  
219  Art 7. 
220  General Comment: Article 7 Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, A/44/40 1(992) at 
[4]. 
221  At [9]. 
222  At [4]. 
223  Dublin II Regulation 343/2003 [2003] OJ L 50/1. 
224  Art 10. 
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The Regulation aims to allocate responsibility for processing asylum application equally 
across Europe,225 while introducing a uniform scheme across Member States.226 It 
dictates that all EU States must accept the validity of other States’ asylum decisions 
(within reason) and prevents people abusing the system through submitting multiple 
applications.227  
 
The UNHCR has outspokenly critiqued the scheme, saying in practice it places most of 
the responsibility for processing asylum applications on a small portion of States.228 This 
is clearly the case with the Syrian situation, where a majority of the applications would 
technically need to be assessed by Greece (this is the most common entrance to the EU 
by boat) and Hungary (this is the most common entrance to the EU from Turkey, through 
Bulgaria and Serbia).229 Whether this is in line with EU law is outside the ambit of this 
Paper. 
 
Impoverished Greece is already stretched far beyond its limit with the number of asylum-
seekers arriving there daily and as the case M.S.S v Belgium and Greece, below, points 
out, Greece has failed to provide adequate protection in the past.230 Hungary on the other 
hand is trying to build a razor wire fence to keep asylum-seekers out (a number of other 
countries are also considering, or implementing, this option).231 
  
  
225  Gabriela Coman “European Union Policy on Asylum and its Inherent Human Rights Violations” 
(1998) 64 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1217 at 1219.  
226  Moira Sy “UNHCR and Preventing Indirect Refoulement in Europe” (2015) 27 Int J Refugee Law 
457 at 466. 
227  European Court of Human Rights – Press Unit “Dublin cases” (factsheet, Strasbourg, July 2015) at 
1. 
228  Laura Kok The Dublin II Regulation – a UNHCR Discussion Paper (UNHCR Publishing, 
Brussels, 2006) at 10. 
229  Barbara Tasch and Mike Nudelman “This map shows the routes of Europe’s refugee nightmare – 
and how it’s getting worse” The Business Insider (online ed., 15 September 2015). 
230  See M.S.S v Belgium and Greece (30696/09) Grand Chamber, ECHR, 21 January 2011 at 4. 
231  Rick Lyman “Bulgaria puts up new wall, but this one keeps people out” The New York Times 
(online ed., Lesovo, 5 April 2015). 
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The UNHCR has long called for the system to be replaced by one allocating resources 
and processing claims based on the need of the individual seeking asylum.232 At the time 
of writing, the EU has conceded that the Regulation is not enforceable, and is therefore 
considered partially redundant.233 In response to the apparent flaws of the Regulation, EU 
leaders are discussing its future, including a possible overhaul. 234 
 
In response to the Regulation, Betts has suggests asylum-seekers be allowed to fly to 
Europe to prevent the burden of processing their application falling on Greece and 
Hungary.235  
I Non EU Conventions 
At the end of last century, Africa and the Americas dealt with large numbers of refugees 
who chose to leave their homes to alleviate their misery.236 
 
This has resulted in the Convention Concerning the Specific Aspect of Refugee Problems 
in Africa (OAU Convention)237 and the Cartagena Declaration.238 These two Treaties 
widened the definition of ‘refugee’239 beyond what is provided in the Refugee 
Convention. Outside of Human Rights Law, these Treaties are the first legal instruments 
that would recognise the displaced Syrians as refugees, should the instruments apply in 
EU. This Paper will use the two instruments to assess whether EU States should consider 
entering a region specific Treaty in regards about displaced Syrian people.  
 
  
232  Kok, above n 228, at 9. 
233  Duncan Robinson “How the EU plans to overhaul ‘Dublin regulation’ on asylum claims” the 
Financial Times (online ed., Brussels, 20 January 2016). 
234  Duncan Robinson “How the EU plans to overhaul ‘Dublin regulation’ on asylum claims” the 
Financial Times (online ed., Brussels, 20 January 2016). 
235  Alexander Betts “Let Refugees Fly to Europe” The New York Times (online ed, Oxford, 24 
September 2015). 
236  Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention) 
1001 UNTS 45 (opened for signature 10 September 1969, entered into force 20 June 1974) at 
Preamble. 
237  At Preamble. 
238  Declaración de Cartagena sobre Refugiados, adopted during the Coloquio Sobre la Protección 
Internacional de los Refugiados en América Central, México y Panamá: Problemas Jurídicos y 
Humanitarios, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10 (1984) (Cartagena Declaration). 
239  OAU Convention, above n 236, art 2 and Cartagena Declaration, above n 238, art 3. 
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This is analysed from the viewpoint of what is beneficial for the displaced persons, not 
from a State sovereignty perspective. 
1 Convention Concerning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
The OAU Convention was entered into near the end 1960s by African States to address 
the growing issue of displaced persons in the continent. In addition to using the same 
definition for a ‘refugee’ as the Refugee Convention,240 it contains a second, 
complementary definition, covering:241 
 
… every person who, owing to an external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of 
his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality. 
 
Should EU States wish to recognise the displaced persons as genuine refugees, but are 
blocked by the stringent requirements under the Refugee Convention, EU States could 
consider entering into a separate EU-only Convention that follows the OAU 
Convention’s wider definition of ‘refugee’. It is suggested that, should EU host States be 
willing to re-home the displaced persons, a new Convention could make recognition as a 
‘refugee’ and assimilation into the host State’s society easier.  
2 Declaración de Cartagena Sobre los Refugiados (Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees) 
The Cartagena Declaration is a non-binding agreement adopted in 1984 by Mexico, 
Panama and Central American States.242 The instrument aims to coordinate and 
harmonise the humanitarian action for recognised refugees and work towards effective 
protection of their human rights.243 
  
  
240  OAU Convention, above n 236, art 1. 
241  Art 2. 
242  Cartagena Declaration, above n 238, preamble. 
243  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Cartagena Declaration (UNHCR - 
Media Relations and Public Information Service, Switzerland, 1984) at 33. 
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The Declaration’s definition further expands on the one drafted in the OAU Convention 
to include threats of generalised violence and human rights violation. Although not 
legally binding, it recommends that Member States:244 
 
… include among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, 
safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign 
aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order. 
 
Again, for the Syrian situation, this definition seems to recognise the displaced persons as 
genuine refugees. It appears to recognise the more contemporary reasons diving persons 
flee their homeland. In the Syrian case, this appears to be the threat of generalised 
violence and other violations of human rights. 
 
Similar to the Refugee Convention, the Cartagena Declaration requires the individual 
seeking refugee status to show a causal link between themselves and a real risk of harm 
or a real threat to their life, safety or freedom.245 If a similar definition is applied to 
displaced Syrians in the EU, it appears this could help separate the genuine asylum-
seekers from the migrants. The implications of introducing the scheme are not within the 
scope of this Paper. 
J The Responsibility to Protect 
The principle of a collective responsibility to protect is not in itself a legal principle, 
rather it finds its roots in previous bodies of international law, including IHL.246 The 
principle is narrow in scope and is supposed to complement IHL by sharing the joined 
objective of protecting vulnerable persons during armed conflict.247 
  
  
244  Cartagena Declaration, above, n 238, art 3. 
245  Art 3. 
246  Australian Red Cross International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibility to Protect 
(Handbook, Australian Red Cross, Carlton, 2011) at 5. 
247  At 5. 
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Glanville says since the start of the century, the idea that States have a collective 
responsibility to protect has gained traction in international law.248 The idea entails that 
sovereign States not only have a responsibility to protect their own populations from 
atrocities, but they also have a collective responsibility to protect the population of other 
States, if the State is manifestly failing to do so.249 
 
Those in favour of a collective responsibility to protect believe the days of independent 
and sovereign States are numbered.250 This will be replaced by, not only a negative duty 
from perpetrating harm, but a positive duty to protect others from harm.251   
 
While relatively new, the principle has been interpreted to mean a State has the 
responsibility to intervene to protect another State’s population from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, through the use of appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, such as trade sanctions.252 How and 
when exactly this international legal obligation of bystander States should apply is not yet 
confirmed.253  
 
In terms of the Syrian situation, those in favour of a wider collective responsibility to 
protect beyond borders, suggest EU States owe this responsibility to the Syrian people.254 
Fargues and Fandrich, amongst others, suggest this responsibility includes offering the 
people asylum within EU States, if they cannot guarantee protection within Syria.255  
  
  
248  Luke Glanville “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders” (2012) 1 Hum Rts L Rev 1 at 1. 
249  At 5. 
250  At 5. 
251  At 5. 
252   At 13. 
253  At 4. 
254  Fargues and Fandrich, above n 90, at 15. 
255 At 15. 
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In the judgment Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro256, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) found while an international collective responsibility to protect 
beyond borders does exist, this only applies to protecting against genocide.257 The 
interesting point in this case was that the genocide it referred to was committed in Bosnia 
against Bosnians by Serbians, therefore the judgment could not attach the responsibility 
to a territorial link.258 The ICJ judgment concluded that a collective responsibility to 
protect exists for failing to prevent and punish the crime genocide.259  
 
This was distinguished from complicity in committing genocide, for which the Court 
imposed a stringent test that it found the organs of the Serbian State had not met.260 First, 
the crime of genocide must have actually occurred (actus rea),261 and secondly, the State 
accused of breaching its responsibility must have had knowledge of the specific intent 
(dolus specialis) of the principle perpetrator (mens rea).262 The State organs of Serbia 
were not found to have this knowledge.263  
  
256  Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro). 
257  At [430]. 
258  Rachael Lorna Johnstone “State Responsibility: a Concerto for Court, Council and Committee” 
[2009] 1 DJILP 63 at 66. 
259  At 72. 
260  Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, above n 256, at [422]. 
261  At [421]. 
262  At [421]. 
263  At [424]. 
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Despite the clear links between the collective responsibility to prevent (through 
complicity) genocide and the collective responsibility to prevent and punish genocide, the 
Court found Serbia had breached only the second responsibility.264 For this finding, the 
Court imposed a carefully distinguished test. While the actus rea for complicity required 
positive actions, for failing to prevent, omissions will suffice.265 In this case, Serbia did 
nothing to prevent the genocide, which was considered enough to satisfy the test.266 It 
need not be shown the “State concerned had the power to prevent the genocide; it is 
sufficient that it had the means to do so and it manifestly refrained from using them.”267 
The mental element could be satisfied if it can be shown that those in charge of the 
State’s organs are aware there is a “serious danger that the acts of genocide would be 
committed”.268 
 
As mentioned above, there is insufficient evidence to believe mass genocide is occurring 
in Syria.269 However, while the ICJ judgment ruled the responsibility to protect beyond 
border principle was only applicable to preventing and punishing genocide, other 
organisations, including the UN and International Law Commission (ILC), advise it could 
also apply to war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.270  
 
As it currently stands, the extended application of the principle is not legally binding and 
the UN’s Secretary-General has suggested Member States can opt out of it if they 
wish.271 However, given the speed at which the principle has developed in the past 15 
years, there is a distinct possibility it will further develop to include these crimes.272 
Therefore, it is beneficial to see if the wider responsibility would place further duties on 
EU States in relation to Syrian asylum-seekers.  
  
  
264  Glanville, n 248, at 17. 
265  Johnstone, above 258, at 72. 
266  Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, above n 256, at [438]. 
267  At [438]. 
268  At [432]. 
269  Seth Kaplan “Syria’s Ethnic and Political Division” (2013) Fragile States 
<www.fragilestates.org>.  
270  See for example: 2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [138] and 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001 GA Res 56/83, A/Res/56/83 (2001) at 31. 
271  Implementing the responsibility to protect Secretary General Report A/63/677 (2009) at 8. 
272  Glanville, above n 248, at 32. 
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The test for a collective responsibility to prevent and prosecute genocide from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro will be applied to the current facts. It will look to 
establish whether a collective duty to prevent war crimes exists, as this appears to be the 
most relevant. In terms of what the duty specifically entails, the test aims to assess 
whether the EU States have a responsibility to prevent war crimes through offering 
displaced Syrians asylum. The alternative is that the Syrians remain in, or are returned to, 
Syria. 
 
It has already been concluded that grave war crimes are a reality in the present-day Syria 
and this is causing persons to flee their homes. The material element (actus rea) is 
satisfied if it can be shown the EU States have the power to prevent war crimes but have 
manifestly refrained from using this. It seems there are sufficient grounds to argue that 
this test has been met. Through EU States offering asylum to displaced Syrians, it would 
appear that those persons are protected from war crimes. 
 
It could also be argued the mental test is met. It seems likely the relevant organs of the 
EU States would be sufficiently informed of the crimes occurring in Syria. This suggests 
the persons in charge of these organs would have enough knowledge to conclude that 
there is a serious risk of persons in Syria experiencing war crimes.  
 
There is considerable scope to argue the EU States have a responsibility to protect Syrian 
asylum-seekers. However, the ICJ has ruled the principle does not extend to include war 
crimes and any suggestion from the UN or ILC expanding the principle is not binding. 
Again, like the other instruments that could apply, this involves a State exercising its 
discretion and does not place a finite or active duty on the EU States. 
 
V Case Law 
Although case law involving persons who arrived as part of the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
will not be available for some time, the first two cases discussed below provide evidence 
of EU Courts’ propensity to sympathise with asylum-seekers. This includes a tendency to 
circumvent the stringent requirements for recognition of refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention by opting to apply Human Rights instruments instead. The cases show that 
this law is applied so the Courts can ensure persons are entitled to protection from their 
host State in situations where the Refugee Convention would not mandate it. 
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A M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece273 
This was the first judgment in relation to the Dublin II Regulation delivered by the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, heralding a re-think about of how the 
Regulation applies and expanded the protection available for refugees entering the EU.274 
The case shows how applying the Dublin II Regulation to the Syrian Refugee Crisis could 
be problematic because, as mentioned above, a majority of displaced persons entered the 
EU through Greece. 
 
In the case, the Applicant had fled Afghanistan and entered the EU through Greece, 
where his fingerprints were taken and he was detained for a week; he did not apply for 
asylum in Greece.275 Later, he presented himself to the Aliens Office in Belgium and 
applied for asylum, where he was finger printed and the Office was able to establish he 
had originally arrived in Greece.276 
 
Using Article 10 of the Dublin II Regulation277, the Belgium Aliens Office ruled Greece 
was responsible for processing the applicant’s refugee-status application and asked him to 
leave the country. Despite receiving a letter from the UNHCR a month earlier 
recommending a stop to all refugee transfers to Greece, the Office stipulated that there 
was no evidence to suggest Greece would not respect its obligations under the Refugee 
Convention.278 
 
The Applicant claimed he faced a real fear of being murdered in Afghanistan because he 
had worked as an interpreter for international air force troops in Kabul and provided 
evidence of this employment.279  
  
  
273  M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (15809/02) Grand Chamber, ECHR 21 January 2011. 
274  Patricia Mallia “Case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece: a catalyst in the re-thinking of the Dublin II 
Regulations” (2011) RSQ 107 at 108. 
275  M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, at 273, at 4. 
276  At 4. 
277  Dublin II Regulation, above n 223, art 10. 
278  M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, above n 273, at 5. 
279  At 6. 
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The Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights originally ruled the transfer 
to Greece was legal and refused the Applicant’s appeal to remain in Belgium. On arrival 
in Greece, he:280 
 
… was locked up in a small space with twenty other detainees, had access to the 
toilets only at the discretion of the guards, was not allowed out into the open air, was 
given very little to eat and had to sleep on a dirty mattress or on the bare floor. 
 
A number of other events occurred in the lead up to his appeal to the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights, none of which are material here. It is simply worth 
noting the Applicant described his time in Greece as very disagreeable and in violation of 
basic human rights.281 
 
To establish whether the transfer to Greece was legal or not, the Grand Chamber analysed 
the Dublin II Regulation, the Refugee Convention and aspects of law specific to the EU, 
including the Lisbon Treaty and the European Charter of Fundament Rights.282 
 
The Court first established that Greek authorities had violated Article 3 of the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights that prohibits torture and inhumane and degrading 
treatment or punishment in their treatment of the Applicant.283 
 
The Court used the Charter of Rights to extend the protection available to asylum-seekers 
beyond what is afforded under the Refugee Convention. The Court analysed an EU 
Directive on the reception of asylum seekers and Greek domestic legislation that 
transposed the Directive and the Charter of Rights.284 The Court was of the opinion that 
while no law requires Greece to provide people seeking refugee status with financial 
assistance or a home, there was “an obligation to provide accommodation and decent 
material conditions to impoverished asylum-seekers in the terms of positive law”.285  
 
  
280  At 7. 
281  Mallia, above n 274, at 118. 
282  At 113. 
283  M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, above n 273, at 19. 
284  Mallia, above n 274, at 119. 
285  At 119. 
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Rather than considering the individual’s illegal entry into the EU as an aggravating 
feature, the Court chose treat it as a mitigating feature.286 The Court held while the entry 
may have been illegal, this in itself did not justify detaining the individual.287 
 
In discussing the applicant’s asylum-seeker status, the Court stated that in assessing if 
Article 3 had been breached, the Applicant’s vulnerability needed to be taken into 
account.288 In its deliberation, the Court pointed out that the Applicant was “particularly 
vulnerable because of everything he had been through during his migration and the traumatic 
experiences he was likely to have endured previously.”289 
 
It was interesting the Court placed more weight on the rights of the Applicant simply because 
he was an asylum seeker. In essence, the Court suggests that the illegal immigrant status of 
the applicant meant he was entitled to better protection from the State authorities, not 
less.290 The status definitely did not mean that the Applicant was less protected against 
arbitrary and degrading treatment.291 
 
The judgment in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece provides a good example of how the EU 
Courts have bypassed the stringent requirements of the Refugee Convention through 
using other legal instruments to interpret the law that applies.  
 
The Court also analyses other EU instruments of Human Rights Law, namely the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms292 
(Human Rights Convention). 
  
  
286  M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, above n 273, at 19. 
287  At 19. 
288  At 47. 
289  At 47. 
290  At 60. 
291  At 60. 
292  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom 213 UNTS 222 
(opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 21 September 1970). 
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The Court looked at Article 13 (everyone who has their rights violated has the right to 
effective remedies under domestic law293), Article 3 (the prohibition of degrading or 
inhumane treatment294), and Article 2 (the right to life295) and concluded that when read 
together, these Articles prevent both direct and indirect refoulement and require the State 
to offer protection to the individual.296  
 
In building the case against Belgium, the Court assessed whether the Dublin II 
Regulation meant Belgium was required to return the Applicant to Greece, no matter 
what the circumstances.297 The Court concluded that no, it was not.298  
 
Although the Court talked extensively about the principle of non-refoulement, but at no 
stage did it analyse Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, rather it chooses only to focus 
on breaches of the Human Rights Convention:299 
 
… in view of the importance which the Court attaches to Article 3 of the Convention 
and the irreversible nature of the damage which may result if the risk of torture or ill-
treatment materialises, the effectiveness of a remedy within the meaning of Article 
13 imperatively requires close scrutiny by a national authority. 
 
The case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece highlights the EU Courts’ desire to find ways 
around the stringent requirements under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention through 
stretching the applicability of the Human Rights Convention. The case also highlights 
that the Courts are willing to override other EU legislation, such as the Dublin II 
Regulation, to ensure asylum-seekers are protected by their host State, even if they are 
not technically protected by the Refugee Convention.300 
  
  
293  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, above n 292, art 13. 
294  Art 3. 
295  Art 2. 
296  M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, above n 273, at 54. 
297  Mallia, above n 274, at 122. 
298  At 122. 
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Given the sheer number of people who have arrived and the stress this has placed on 
Member States301 it will be interesting to see whether the Courts will continue to interpret 
refugee law in a lenient manner shown in M.S.S. However, given the growing anti-Syrian 
sentiment in the EU, there is also a chance this will not continue.302  
B Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy303 
In this case, the applicants were part of a group of about 200 individuals from Eritrea and 
Somalia who were apprehended on their way by boat from Libya to Italy in 2009. About 
35 nautical miles from the Italian coast the applicants were intercepted by Italian Police 
and Coast Guard boats, they were then transferred onto an Italian military boat and taken 
back to Tripoli.304 
 
At a press conference held after the return of the individuals to Libya:305 
 
… the Italian Minister of the Interior stated that the operation to intercept the vessels 
on the high seas and to push the migrants back to Libya was the consequence of the 
entry into force on 4 February 2009 of bilateral agreements concluded with Libya, 
and represented an important turning point in the fight against clandestine 
immigration. 
 
When establishing whether the transfer was legal, the Court in this case also looked to 
Human Rights Law as a way to circumvent the Refugee Convention.306  Instead of 
looking at Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, the Court analysed the principle of non-
refoulement under Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights (the prohibition of 
torture or cruel and degrading treatment), placing significant weight on the irreversible 
damage that could result should a person be returned to a country where the risk of ill-
treatment or torture could materialise.307 
 
  
301  António Guterres, above n 2, at 3. 
302  Nesrine Malik “The migrant bogeyman is back” The Guardian (online ed., London, 14 January 
2016). 
303  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (27765/09) Grand Chamber, ECHR 23 February 2012. 
304  At [10-11]. 
305  At [13]. 
306  At [200]. 
307  At [200]. 
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Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are binding on all European Union 
member States and its jurisdiction is compulsory for all members.308 
C Germany v Y and Z309 
This case examined what exactly ‘persecution’ in refugee law entails and whether a 
person who seeks asylum in Europe should have taken any step available to him or her 
which could have mitigated or prevented the persecution.310 
 
This case was an appeal from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (the German Federal 
Administrative Court) that had rejected the asylum applications of two Pakistani 
nationals, Y and Z, who were members of the Ahmadiyya religion.311 Under Article 
298C of the Pakistani Criminal Code, practicing the Ahmadiyya faith is a criminal 
offence. Essentially the German Courts wanted to know inter alia whether Y and Z’s 
inability to practice their religion in public amounted to ‘persecution’.312 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union analysed the case in light of the Refugee 
Convention and a Directive of the Council of the European Union on asylum,313 the 
purpose of which was to create a common European asylum system, based on an 
inclusive application of the Refugee Convention its Protocol.314   
 
The Court held that repression of a right of freedom of religion could amount to 
‘persecution’ under Articles 9 and 10 of the Directive (or Article 1 of the Refugee 
Convention):315 
 
…where an applicant for asylum, as a result of exercising that freedom in his country 
of origin, runs a genuine risk of, inter alia, being prosecuted or subject to inhumane 
or degrading treatment or punishment… (emphasis added) 
 
  
308  Council of Europe Access by the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(online ed., 1 June 2010, Strasburg) at 1.  
309  Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11 Germany v Y and Z [2012] ECR I. 
310  Leboeuf and Tsourdi, above n 212, at 402. 
311  Germany v Y and Z, above n 309, at [2]. 
312  At [3] – [5]. 
313  Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted 2004/83/EC [2004] OJ L304/12. 
314  Directive, above 313, at introduction. 
315  Germany v Y and Z, above n 309, at [62]. 
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The Court used the ‘consequences’ test and emphasised the need to assess the severity of 
the concrete consequences that would arise, should the asylum-seeker not be granted the 
protection of his or her host State and potentially be subjected to refoulement.316 
 
The Court further stated there must be causal link between the act of persecution and the 
reason for the persecution, which must correlate with one of the grounds listed in Article 
10 of the Directive317 (these are exactly the same as the grounds for persecution listed in 
the Refugee Convention, race, religion, nationality, political opinion and membership of a 
particular social group). 
 
On this reasoning of Y and Z, it would seem unlikely the majority of Syrians in the EU 
would be recognised as refugees. Even if one ignores the five grounds for persecution 
under Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, it still seems unlikely that these people are 
able to point to any concrete consequences that will eventuate should they be refoulered 
to Syria. Even though grave war crimes are occurring daily in Syria, and as a collective 
group, displaced Syrians run a real risk of experiencing these if returned to Syria, it 
would not seem that there is a sufficiently concrete consequence or likelihood that this 
will occur specifically to each individual to satisfy the test in Y and Z. 
 
Furthermore – and as mentioned above, this seems to be where international law 
precludes host EU States from having compulsory duties in relation to displaced Syrians 
– there is no causal link between war crimes occurring in Syria and one of the grounds 
listed in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention. 
 
VI  Alternatives 
The Syrian Refugee Crisis gives rise to questions of what duties EU States have in 
regards to Syrian asylum-seekers, including whether States are required to grant them 
citizenship and provide employment opportunities and other necessities such as 
housing.318 While international law does place a duty on EU and other host States, this 
duty is open to a lot of discretion and is essentially open to State interpretation in terms of 
how and when it will apply. 
  
  
316  Germany v Y and Z, above n 309, at [65]. 
317  At [55]. 
318  Jeanne Park “Europe’s Migration Crisis” (23 September 2015) Council for Relations 
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From the displaced persons’ perspective, it would appear a change to the Refugee 
Convention governing who can be granted asylum and who cannot, would be a preferable 
way forward in regards to the Crisis. This change could widen the definition of ‘refugee’, 
meaning persons escaping war crimes are recognised as genuine refugees, similar to the 
OAU Convention or the Cartagena Declaration. 
 
If EU States do not regard this as a preferable option, there are a number of other 
possibilities States could consider. 
A Refoulement  
Large-scale return (refoulement) of Syrian asylum-seekers from the EU back to Syria at 
this stage does not appear to be a viable option for a number of reasons. Firstly, because 
in the past few years the EU Courts have given a strong indication to suggest people who 
face a real risk of murder, torture or inhumane or degrading treatment in their country of 
origin should not be returned. This has been held to apply to persons who would 
otherwise not be protected against refoulement by the Refugee Convention, because they 
do not fall under one of the five categories of that instrument.319 In the current situation, 
given the widespread bombing of densely populated civilian areas, it seems unlikely that 
any State can guarantee protection.  
 
It has also been suggested that the principle of non-refoulement could possibly be of jus 
cogens nature.320  
B Voluntary repatriation 
The option of voluntary repatriation after the hostilities have ended could be considered. 
If applied as directed by UNHCR, once the hostilities have concluded, refugees would be 
given a choice whether they wished to voluntarily return home, or continue to live in 
exile.321  
 
Given the sheer volumes of refugees who have come into the EU, a more concrete 
version of voluntary repatriation could be considered, for example, through offering 
temporary asylum. 
  
319  See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, above n 302. 
320  Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem “The Scope and Content of the Principle of non-
refoulement: Opinion” Erika Feller Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds) Refugee Protection 
in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 87 at 141. 
321  Loescher and others, above n 19, at 16. 
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C Temporary asylum 
When a displaced person is not recognised as a genuine refugee under the Refugee 
Convention, a State is able to exercise its sovereignty in determining whether to offer the 
person asylum or not.322 Boston University School of Law suggests that EU States could 
also consider offering displaced Syrians temporary asylum, rather than permanent refugee 
status.323 
 
The School makes a recommendation whereby the temporary protection scheme would 
offer both internally displaced Syrians and Syrians displaced in other areas of the Middle 
East temporary protection in an EU State.324 The granting of temporary asylum would be 
a discretionary decision made by EU representatives within the Middle East. This 
decision would be based on family ties and any other factors that the State wishes to take 
into account.325 This temporary asylum:326 
 
… will allow Syrians to receive the aid they need while retaining the ability to 
return home when the conflict is over— creating additional incentives for the EU 
to be more actively engaged in bringing the Syrian conflict to an end.  
 
Offering temporary asylum would also fulfil the positive obligation placed on EU States 
by judgment M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece327 to protect people from issues such a poverty 
and homelessness, even if the person is not a recognised refugee.328  
  
  
322  Gil-Baso, above n 7, at 6. 
323  Sarah Bidinger and others Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility 
Sharing (Boston University Press, Boston, 2015) at 7. 
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325  At 8. 
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D Internal ‘safe zones’ 
‘Safe zones’ have been used in a number of previous conflicts, to varying levels of 
success, for example in Iraq in the 1990s329, Haiti330, Bosnia331 and Rwanda332. 
 
The idea is to create temporary short-term protection pockets within the country of origin 
– or close to its border in a neighbouring country – where displaced people can find 
refuge until the cessation of hostilities or until fundamental changes can be implemented 
to allow the people to return home safely. These protection areas are normally created by, 
and looked after by governments of a third State, usually the United States; humanitarian 
institutions, such as the UNHCR; and non-government organisations.333 
 
To run effectively, ‘safe zones’ are predicated to operate in an environment that has a 
functioning rule of law.334 McNamara mentions when this rule of law is not present, it 
becomes very difficult for organisations such as the UNHCR to do their job.335 States at 
war do not normally have a high functioning rule of law and as a result, will happily keep 
refugees on sensitive borders and arms routes rather than allowing them to leave the 
conflict area.336  
 
McNamara further suggests that while ‘safe zones’ are reportedly created for 
humanitarian purposes, in reality they have been used as a mechanism to prevent the flow 
of asylum-seekers into third States. As a consequence, the UN and other parties to the 
humanitarian and peacekeeping process have been required to focus not only on 
protecting the camps’ residents, but also on preventing their escape. 337 
  
  
329  Bill Frelicks, above n 105, at 39. 
330  At 39. 
331  At 40. 
332  At 42. 
333  At 37. 
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The Refugee Convention does not prevent the creation of internal protection mechanisms, 
nor does it prevent States from granting refugee status to individuals who could have 
availed themselves to protection within, or near the border of their State of origin.338 
Should internal mechanisms be relied upon as a legal means to refouler Syrian persons 
from the EU to a ‘safe zone’ within, or near the border of, Syria, the EU States must be 
satisfied that they will “have access to meaningful internal protection against the risk of 
persecution”.339 
 
While on paper this sounds like an admirable and practical solution for the European 
Refugee Crisis, experience shows in reality it is not always as successful as it sounds. For 
example, around 7,000 Muslim men and boys were murdered in the ‘safe zone’ created 
for Bosnians in Srebrenica on 11 July 1995.340 This event was the subject of the ICJ case 
Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro and was later classed as an act of 
‘genocide’.341 
 
The French mandated ‘safe zone’ that was created in southwest Rwanda to protect both 
Hutus and Tutsis, ended in a Rwandan Government led “massacre on April 17 [1995, 
where] automatic rifles, machine-guns, grenades and rocket-propelled grenades were 
deployed against the camp’s residents”.342  
 
The UN Security Council has found it difficult to come to an agreement about the conflict 
in Syria343 and it is not clear if the Council will mandate the creation of a ‘safe zone’. 
However, taking in mind the lessons learned from the Bosnian and Rwandan cases, it is 
suggested that the creation of a ‘safe zone’, funded by the UN, in one of Syria’s border 
States could be considered to stem the flow of displaced persons into the EU.  
  
  
338  James C Hathaway and others (eds) The Michigan Guidelines on the International Protection of 
Refugees 1998 – 2007 (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2009) at 16. 
339  At 24. 
340  Declared a safe zone in: Resolution: Bosnia and Herzegovina SC Res 824, S/25700 (1993).   
341  Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-98-33, 19 April 2004. 
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In fact, some moves have already been made to create a ‘zone’ of sorts in Turkey.344 Near 
the end of 2015, EU States provided €3 billion of funding to Turkey in return for the 
State providing fast-track access to visas for displaced persons in Turkey in an aim to 
prevent them continuing on into the EU.345 At the time of writing, EU States are planning 
to send displaced persons who are not given asylum in the EU to Turkey and are 
considering further funding.346 
 
Given that there are currently close to 4 million refugees in Syria’s neighbouring States, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq,347 more than 2 million of which are already in Turkey, 
this could be a viable solution.348 To succeed under the humanitarian spirit of IHL and 
the Conventions mentioned above, (particularly if EU States are sending the persons from 
the EU back to Turkey) EU States would need to ensure that displaced persons in Turkey 
are provided with the same or similar protections as they would be under the Refugee 
Convention.  As it currently stands, the camps or ‘zones’ in Turkey are described as 
open-air prisons349 (used for the purposes of retaining people rather than a humanitarian 
purpose, as described by McNamara, above) 350 and do not appear to be of an adequate 
standard. If extra funding could be used to build schools, provide work opportunities and 
the other basic rights provided under the Refugee Convention, this could be a way that 
EU States can fulfil their humanitarian obligations under IHL and other international 
instruments while retaining some of their sovereignty. The implications for Turkey are 
outside the scope of this Paper. 
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VII  Conclusion  
The Refugee Convention aims to protect genuine refugees by distinguishing them from 
other migrants. Under Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, refugees must meet stringent 
requirements to be granted protection under the instrument. It is concluded that the 
majority of displaced Syrians in the EU do not meet this stringent test and therefore, 
protections under the Convention do not automatically apply.  
 
While displaced persons are protected under additional instruments of international law, 
notably under IHL in Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocol I, recognition under 
these is reliant on the person being on the territory of a party to the conflict and in the 
case of the Protocol, application relies on the individual being recognised under the 
Refugee Convention. 
 
Because the persons discussed are in the EU, there is possible scope to argue protections 
afforded under Human Rights Law could apply to them. Given the EU Courts propensity 
to circumvent the stringent requirements under the Refugee Convention, this could be an 
option applicable to displaced Syrian persons that allows them to legally stay in the EU. 
 
Another option that EU host States can explore, is to expanding the definition for a 
recognised refugee under an EU-only Convention, similar to Africa and the Americas. 
This could extend the protection of the Refugee Convention to include persons who face 
a real threat of experiencing war crimes or generalised violence in their country of origin. 
This would allow displaced Syrians to benefit from the protection of their host State, 
while allowing EU States to satisfy their obligations under a number of Human Rights 
instruments (most notably the EU Charter of Rights which binds all Member States). It 
also recognises the principle to protect beyond borders and interprets the applicable IHL 
instruments in its widest humanitarian sprit, as recommended by the ICRC.   
  
  
 The relationship between an internationally displaced person and their host State under international law 
  
 
57 
It is suggested that to fulfil the obligations listed above, EU States consider offering 
temporary asylum to those already in their territory. It is further recommended that 
persons be allocated between EU States based on the State’s available resources, rather 
than the Dublin II Regulation. For persons seeking asylum who are currently outside the 
EU, it is suggested that EU States work with the UN and other States with a stake in this 
conflict, for example the United States, to create a ‘safe zone’ that really is safe. This 
zone would entitle the persons residing in it to the same protection from the supervising 
States as would be available to them from a host State under the Refugee Convention.  
 
It is suggested that this recommendation would provide some humanitarian relief for a 
situation that is extremely complex. 
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